We provide an axiomatic preference-based model of asset-pricing based on an extension of Gul's disappointment aversion model. By introducing a more flexible definition of the endogenous disappointment threshold, our Generalized Disappointment Aversion (GDA) preferences focus risk-preferences more explicitly on tail events. This is consistent with both experimental evidence such as Allais' paradox as well as common risk-management practices such as "value at risk." We show in a Lucas-tree economy that GDA risk preferences are a substantial improvement over both the disappointment aversion and expected utility models. In particular, since disappointment effects are endogenously state-dependent, GDA preferences generate effective risk aversion that is counter-cyclical. In addition, the model also produces a large equity premium and a risk-free rate that is pro-cyclical and has low volatility.
Introduction
The observed facts of aggregate risks and asset prices in the post-war US economy have led researchers to explore models of intertemporal preferences that generalize the well-developed time-additive expected-utility specification used in the asset-pricing economy of Lucas (1978) . In particular, models that allow for counter-cyclical risk aversion have been shown to perform much better than the standard model (see, for example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , Gordon and St-Amour (2000) , and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) ).
1 This leads us to explore the preference foundations that may produce this behavior endogenously. Our preference specification is a one-parameter extension of the Gul (1991) disappointment aversion utility function. These new preferences have the desirable property that, when embedded in a dynamic asset-pricing economy, effective risk aversion can be counter-cyclical. Moreover, the state prices that our risk-preference assumptions generate are precisely those that rationalize the equity-premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985) . Melino and Yang (2003) provide a useful characterization of the need for counter-cyclical risk aversion by calculating the pricing kernel in the Mehra and Prescott economy. Setting the first two moments of endowment growth, x t , equal to the Mehra and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) capture counter-cyclical risk aversion through an external habit with a time-varying "habit sensitivity." Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and create this with a utility function that features a time-varying loss aversion (a direct disutility from negative stock market returns). Gordon and St-Amour (2000) take a more direct approach and calibrate a time-varying risk aversion parameter.
probabilities, π jk , into risk-neutral probabilitiesπ jk : (1) In the high growth state the risk-neutral probabilities are very close to the true transition probabilities (compareπ HL to π HL ). This suggests a low degree of risk aversion in this state. In the low state, however, the risk-neutral probabilities place a great deal more weight on the low outcome than the true probabilities (compareπ LL to π LL ). This implies a high degree of risk aversion in the low-growth state. It is immediately apparent why a traditional time-additive expected utility function will have difficulty matching historical asset-return behavior. In that model,π LL /π LH =π HL /π HH . Thus a high degree of risk aversion in one state implies a high degree in the other.
Thus far, axiomatic preferences have had little success in capturing the dynamic pattern of asset prices displayed in equation (1). For example, Gul (1991) is an axiomatic characterization of preferences that allows for an asymmetric treatment of the outcomes of a lottery based on where the outcomes lie relative to an implicit certainty equivalent. In essence, outcomes below the certainty equivalent are disappointing and, hence, receive relatively more weight in the utility calculation of a disappointment-averse agent. Gul's relaxation of the independence axiom yields preferences that are consistent with the Allais Paradox. Unfortunately, Gul preferences do not capture asset returns dynamics (see Epstein and Zin (1990), (2001) , and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997) ). In a Lucas-tree endowment economy disappointment aversion behaves much like standard expected utility risk aversion. Since the certainty equivalent is similar across states, the disappointment threshold and, hence, the effect of disappointment, are similar across states. Thus, disappointment-averse preferences can generate large risk aversion but, in a way that is symmetric across states (a feature shared with expected utility).
In this paper, we provide an axiomatic model of preferences over atemporal risks that generalizes the disappointment aversion model of Gul (1991) . Disappointment averse preferences overweight outcomes that are "disappointing," which is defined as being below the certainty equivalent. We extend the Gul model by modifying the definition of a disappointing outcome to allow for an emphasis on more extreme outcomes. For Generalized Disappointment Aversion (GDA) preferences, an outcome is disappointing only when it is sufficiently far from the implicit certainty equivalent. This moves the disappointment threshold away from certainty. Since the transition probabilities can change with the current state, the disappointment threshold can be statedependent. Thus, the number of outcomes that are disappointing can also vary with the state. In an asset pricing context, this can lead to risk aversion that is effectively larger in some states. In fact, our calibration results show that in a version of a Lucas-tree economy in which the representative agent has generalized disappointment aversion asset return properties are closer to the data than both disappointment aversion and expected utility models. GDA preferences generate substantial counter-cyclical risk aversion through disappointment effects that are endogenously state-dependent. Besides generating a counter-cyclical risk aversion, the model also produces a large equity premium and a risk-free rate that is pro-cyclical and has low volatility.
Disappointment averse preferences are motivated by puzzling experimental results like the Allais paradox (see Allais (1979) , Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Machina (1987) ) and Conlisk (1989) ). Choices in these experiments often imply preferences that violate the independence axiom of expected utility. Like disappointment aversion, our GDA preferences can rationalize the Allais experimental results. They also capture the common practice in portfolio management of focusing on lower-tail events through "value at risk" constraints. Motivating functional forms for utility with basic axioms of choice is somewhat nonstandard for a quantitative asset-pricing exercise. We proceed in this fashion for a number of very practical, rather than purely theoretical, reasons. It serves to eliminate the potential for postulating behavior that would be generally viewed as "irrational." That is, we avoid violating the basic properties of transitivity, monotonicity, and continuity as we consider departures from expected utility. In addition, starting with basic axioms governing choice over risky outcomes leads to a better understanding of the behavioral roles played by the parameters in our model. This is helpful for assessing both the reasonableness of parameter values and the likelihood of parameter stability across different economic and government policy environments. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) are both examples of asset pricing models where the behavioral assumptions yield effective counter-cyclical risk aversion. Our GDA preferences differ from these approaches in several important ways. First, our risk characterization is atemporal. Thus we can use a recursive framework where static risk preferences are distinct from deterministic intertemporal substitution. Second, our preference construction can be homothetic which facilitates aggregation (as with CRRA expected utility preferences) and a stationary dynamic programming approach. This feature is the result of the property that the disappointment threshold is as an "internal" reference points. Outcomes are compared to the gamble's certainty equivalent. Therefore, there is no need for external scaling or reference point. Both Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) use aggregate consumption as a scaling variable in preferences. This can make both policy analysis and aggregation more challenging than the more familiar CRRA expected utility environment. Lastly, our GDA preferences are linear-in-probabilities.
2 This feature, shared with expected utility, implies our model can be analyzed with standard Euler-equation techniques (rather than simulation) which can form the basis for structural econometric exercises via methods such as GMM or Hansen-Jaganathan bounds.
The paper is organized by starting with the axiomatic foundations of Generalized Disappointment Aversion in Section 2. Along with the axioms, several of the properties of the resulting GDA utility function are presented. Section 3 presents the infinite horizon, Lucas-tree economy using the GDA preferences along with a Mehra-Prescott-like calibration exercise. There we explain why our model is able to generate counter-cyclical risk aversion and, hence, im-prove on existing preference-based explanations of the equity premium puzzle. Section 4 points to directions for future research and concludes.
Generalized Disappointment Aversion
In this section, we present the axioms which are necessary and sufficient for a one-parameter generalization of Gul (1991) disappointment aversion. We construct a functional form for risk preferences as a certainty equivalent µ(p) for lottery p that solves
where x i is an outcome with probability p(x i ) and θ and δ are preference parameters. In the asset pricing model in Section 3, we use a linearly homogeneous functional form of these preferences with where u(x) = x α α for α ≤ 1, α = 0 and u(x) = log(x) for α = 0. The preferences are similar to expected utility with constant relative risk aversion parameter α, except they impose a penalty, proportional to θ, on outcomes that lie below the disappointment threshold of δµ(p). If θ = 0, the preferences are expected utility. If δ = 1, the preferences are equivalent to Gul disappointment aversion. We generalize Gul preferences by modifying the definition of disappointment. Preferences with δ < 1 capture non-central disappointment aversion by moving the disappointment cut-off. Outcomes are disappointing only if they lie sufficiently far below the certainty equivalent.
Equivalently, preferences in equation (2) can be expressed as
where I(·) is an indicator function.
3 Written in this form, preferences over- I(x≤δµ) . weight items, relative to expected utility, that are disappointing.
The axiomatic derivation of this utility representation, its properties, and some extensions are developed in the remainder of this section. (Some readers may prefer to move directly to the asset pricing model in Section 3.)
Preference Representation
Expected utility preferences are useful in asset pricing settings since they are tractable and involve a small number of parameters. Fortunately, the generalized disappointment aversion (GDA) preferences in (2), that we develop in this section, maintain much of the structure of expected utility. Specifically, GDA preferences, like expected utility, belong to the Chew-Dekel class of preferences (Chew (1983 (Chew ( ), (1989 and Dekel (1986) ). This broad class of preferences generalizes expected utility yet preserves the property that preferences (and first-order conditions) are linear in probabilities (see Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2004) ). This structure comes from Axiom 1, below. To state this axiom, and the two others we need for GDA, let X = [x 0 , x 0 ] be the set of monetary outcomes and L be the set of finite-support lotteries on X. Lotteries that assign probability one to a single x ∈ X are denoted simply as x. Let be a binary relation on L using the standard notation of p q means p is strictly preferred to q, p q denotes weakly preferred, and p ∼ q denotes indifference. The standard properties of preferences are contained in the following axiom.
Axiom 1 -Chew-Dekel Class:
(a) Monotonicity: For x, y ∈ X, x y if and only if x > y,
is complete and transitive, (c) Continuity: For all p ∈ L, the sets {q|q p} and {q|p q} are closed, and (d) Betweenness: For all p, q ∈ L and λ ∈ (0, 1), p q implies p λp
This axiom implies that the certainty equivalent of a lottery, denoted µ(p), with the property that µ(p) ∼ p exists and is a well defined function (i.e., µ : L → X). Characterizing the certainty equivalent function is sufficient to characterizing preferences since monotonicity implies p q if and only if µ(p) ≥ µ(q). This is also a convenient characterization for the recursive utility framework employed in Section 3. The betweenness axiom states that µ(p) ∼ λp + (1 − λ)µ(p). It is this property that implies preferences are linear in probabilities and, therefore, closely related to expected utility.
To generate expected utility preferences, a stronger axiom than betweenness in axiom 1(d) is needed. Expected utility preferences require the independence axiom. Independence states that p 1 p 2 implies λp 1 + (1 − λ)z λp 2 + (1 − λ)z (where z ∈ X and λ ∈ (0, 1)). In words, mixing in a common payoff does not change the relative rankings. In experiments, however, choices often violate this axiom. For example, the Allais (1979) "ratio paradox" and the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) "common consequences" effect both reveal preferences that violate independence (see also Machina (1987) ) and Conlisk (1989) ).
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One explanation for why the independence axiom fails is that observed preferences place a large degree of importance on tail events. This tail-event focus can also be seen in "value at risk" calculations used by practitioners in portfolio management settings. The independence axiom fails to hold since mixing in the payoff lottery z changes the properties of tail outcomes. Gul (1991) characterized this behavior by defining "disappointing" outcomes as those that lie below the lottery's certainty equivalent. We generalize Gul by defining disappointing outcomes as being sufficiently far below the certainty equivalent. The key to our generalization is a change to the definition of disappointment. Axiom 2, below, is a relaxation of the independence axiom that requires preferences to satisfy independence if the choices of p 1 versus p 2 and λp 1 + (1 − λ)z versus λp 2 + (1 − λ)z are "disappointment comparable." Define the set (p 1 , p 2 , z, λ) as disappointment comparable if:
p 2 (x n ) , and (ii) for i = 1, 2 and for all x n ∈ supp(p i )
Disappointment comparability first requires the the lotteries p 1 and p 2 have the same disappointment likelihood relative to the disappointment threshold of δµ(p). Second, comparability requires that mixing in the outcome z does not cause any outcome to switch from being disappointing in p i to not disappointing in λp i + (1 − λ)z, or vice versa. When these two conditions are met, preferences satisfy the independence axiom.
Axiom 2 -δ-Weak Independence:
There exists a δ ≤ 1 such that for all p 1 , p 2 ∈ L, λ ∈ (0, 1), and z ∈ X, p 1 p 2 implies λp 1
The parameter δ specifies how far below an outcome must be below the certainty equivalent before it is considered disappointing. As mentioned above, Gul's disappointment averse preferences set δ = 1 and have a central measure of disappointment. Our generalization allows for a non-central, δ < 1, characterization of disappointment which can allow more focus more on tail events. Whether or not an outcome x is disappointing depends on the lottery p. This is why the preference representation in equation (2) is recursive (an implicit function). Outcomes are not, for example, compared to some external reference point as in a habits model (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ) or Kahneman and Tversky loss aversion (e.g., Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) , Sagi (2003) ). This is an important feature in our asset-pricing exercise in Section 3 since it leads to a pricing kernel that is entirely driven by consumption growth. Disappointment and the δ−weak independence axiom were stated using the certainty equivalent function, µ(p). Since µ(p) exists by axiom 1, stating axioms this way is simpler and, hopefully, more intuitive.
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Axioms 1 and 2 are sufficient to generate an interesting class of preferences.
Theorem 1:
satisfies Axioms 1 and 2 if and only if they are represented by µ(p) such that p q if and only if µ(p) ≥ µ(q), where:
(Proofs is in the appendix.) These preferences are similar to those in equation (2). Except, here disappointing outcomes are scaled by the increasing function (·). These preferences allow for different degrees of risk aversion over disappointing outcomes (similar to Chew (1989) weighted utility). It also has the potential to generate preferences that are analogous to the "S-shaped" valuation function in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ). Unfortunately, unless is linear (proportional), the preferences are not linearly homogeneous and, therefore, ill-suited for the asset pricing setting we explore in Section 3.
The following axiom delivers linearly homogeneity of µ(p) by requiring that outcomes above and below the disappointment threshold be treated proportionally. The axiom is stated by considering two lotteries, p 1 and p 2 that have
where (δ −1 x) is the lottery that pays (δ −1 x) for certain. Then define a decomposition of a lottery as λ ∈ [0, 1] and q, r ∈ L such that p = (1 − λ)q + λr with q ∈ B δ (p) and r ∈ W δ (p). Since lottery q has zero probability on all elements below the threshold δµ(p) and lottery r has zero probability for outcomes above the threshold, λ is the probability of disappointment in the lottery p.
"small tails." In particular, these lotteries have the property that when mixed with a good outcome, x 0 (bad outcome, x 0 ) the outcomes of p 1 and p 2 are all disappointing (all not disappointing). This implies that (·) in equation (5) is linear.
Axiom 3 -δ-Symmetry: Given a δ from Axiom 2, for all
Theorem 2: satisfies Axioms 1-3 if and only if they are represented by µ(p) in equation (2) such that p q if and only if µ(p) ≥ µ(q).
Properties of Generalized Disappointment Aversion
As mentioned above, whether or not an outcome is viewed as disappointing depends on the lottery being considered. Thus, the certainty equivalent in equation (2) is an implicit function. Fortunately, finding the certainty equivalent is a simple fixed-point calculation. Consider the (not implicit) function
M is a continuous function that is (weakly) decreasing in m. µ(p) is defined by
then p has no disappointing outcomes and the certainty equivalent is identical to expected utility. Alternatively, there exists a unique fixed point that is continuous by the implicit function theorem. µ is, of course, appropriately scaled so that µ(x) = x. GDA preferences are equivalent to Gul's disappointment aversion if δ = 1 and equivalent to expected utility if θ = 0 or δ ≤
Using, equation (7), it is straightforward to highlight a few key properties of GDA. First note, µ(p), with u(x) = x α α , is linearly homogeneous. Second, both θ and δ effect the degree of risk aversion. An increase in θ or δ increases risk aversion in that the certainty equivalent falls. Finally, µ(p) is differentiable in x everywhere except x = µ(p). Consider the natural state-space version of (7) (where probabilities are fixed and outcomes vary),
For x i = δµ, we can calculate "marginal utility" as
where, I(·) is an indicator function.
Larger Disappointment Threshold: δ > 1
It seems natural to think of of δ ≤ 1. That is, outcomes are considered disappointing if they lie sufficiently below the certainty equivalent. However, it is straightforward to construct preferences for the case where δ > 1. In this setting, outcomes must be sufficiently far above the certainty equivalent to be considered not disappointing. The certainty equivalent in this case, the analog to (2), is
where A = (1 − θ(δ α − 1)) −1 is the normalization that maintains the scaling µ(x) = x. Monotonicity imposes the restriction that θ(δ α − 1) < 1. Here, a large value of delta (δ >
x 0 x 0 ) produces expected utility preferences. While this specification is unusual since the certainty equivalent is considered "disappointing," it can be helpful in applications to choose which tail of the distribution receives the focus of θ. For example, this specification is useful when exploring consumption growth with positive autocorrelation (see Table 3 ). Figure 1 shows a probability simplex over the payoffs x 1 < x 2 < x 3 . Each line represents lotteries p = [p(x 1 ), p(x 2 ), p(x 3 )] that have the same certainty equivalent, µ(p). (Indifference curves are extended outside the simplex only to facilitate exposition and comparison.) Indifference curves are linear. This is an implication of the betweenness assumption in Axiom 1(d). In Figure  1 (a) preferences are expected utility (θ = 0). As implied by the independence axiom, the indifference curves are linear and parallel. We will return to the other three parameterizations in a moment.
Indifference Curves
It is also helpful to consider indifference curves in two-dimensional statespace where probabilities of the two states are fixed at p(x 1 ) = p(x 2 ) = At µ(p) = x 1 , nothing is disappointing since this is the worst possible outcome and preferences are identical to expected utility. Next consider µ(p) = x 2 . The slope of the indifference curve is controlled by the parameter θ. Since axiom 2 relaxes the independence axiom, the slope of µ(p) = x 2 can differ from the slope of µ(p) = x 1 . Below the threshold µ(p) = x 2 (lower right-hand portion of Figure 1 (b)) only outcome x 1 is disappointing. This produces the "fan" pattern in the lower right. As Machina (1987) noted, the fanning pattern is necessary to address the Allais paradox behavior. Similarly, for lotteries above the µ(p) = x 2 threshold, both x 1 and x 2 are disappointing. This produces the "fan" pattern in the upper portion. Finally, Axiom 3 induces the symmetry between the two regions (reflected about the µ(p) = x 2 line). For example, symmetry implies that µ(p) = x 3 , where every outcome is disappointing, is parallel to µ(p) = x 1 and, hence, consistent with expected utility.
Figure 2(b) shows the indifference curve for disappointment aversion in state space. Since disappointment is defined relative to the certainty equivalent, the indifference curve has a kink at certainty. This is the first-order-riskaversion feature of disappointment aversion. Below the forty-five degree line, it is the state two outcome that is disappointing. Above the forty-five degree line, the state one outcome is disappointing. The parameter θ controls how much extra weight the disappointing outcome receives and, hence, the severity of the kink.
Next, Figure 1 (c) shows the indifference lotteries for GDA (θ = 2, and δ = 0.8) where utility is both "Gul-like" and "expected-utility-like." Again, there are three indifference curves to focus on, µ(p) = x i δ for i = 1, 2, 3. Here, the threshold certainty equivalents are all shifted by the preference parameter δ. For certainty equivalents less than , preferences are identical to expected utility and indifference curves are parallel. The indifference curve at µ(p) = x 2 δ is the threshold where x 2 is disappointing. As in disappointment aversion, the parameter θ determines the slope of this indifference set. As with disappointment aversion, axiom 2 influences preferences differently above and below this threshold producing the "fanning" behavior. Finally, Axiom 3, symmetry, acts in a similar manner to generate symmetric preferences about the µ(p) = x 2 δ threshold. Lastly, the fanning behavior necessary to produce Allais-type behavior exists in the upper portion of the simplex.
Figure 2(c) shows an indifference curve for GDA in state space. Here, disappointment occurs for outcomes less than 80% of the certainty equivalence (δ = 0.8). For gambles close to certainty (shown as the center cone in Figure  2 (c)), preferences are identical to expected utility since neither outcome is disappointing. This is analogous to the lower right hand portion of Figure 1(c) . Lotteries where the state-two payoff is sufficiently low (below the cone) are disappointing (similarly for low state 1 payoffs). The kink in the indifference curves is not at certainty. Here the kink occurs where the x 1 or x 2 is at the δµ(p) threshold. Finally, as long as u(x) is homothetic, GDA preferences are also homothetic. For different utility levels, all kinks lie along the rays that define the cone in Figure 2 (c). , an increase in θ increases the severity of the kink and makes the preferences exhibit more risk aversion. This is also true in GDA in Figure 2 (c) and (d). However, as δ moves away from one, the disappointment threshold is moved further away from certainty, the kink and effective risk aversion decreases. Monotonicity of preferences limits the kink since preferences can, at most, be a vertical (horizontal) line.
Intertemporal Asset Pricing with GDA
We now embed our atemporal axiomatic preference model in a standard representative agent asset-pricing economy, as in Epstein and Zin (1990) . Since GDA preferences are homothetic and depend solely on consumption, they share all the same aggregation properties of CRRA expected utility. Namely, if consumers have identical GDA preferences the cross sectional properties of wealth do not matter. The representative agent consumes a single perishable consumption good in each period. In period t, current consumption, c t , is known with certainty, but future consumption levels are generally uncertain. The intertemporal utility functional is recursive and has the form
where µ t = µ(Ũ t+1 |Ω t ) as defined by equation (2) is the certainty equivalent of random future utility using the period-t conditional probability distribution. ρ is the marginal rate of time preference, and 1 1−γ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The representative agent's economic environment is similar to that in Mehra and Prescott (1985) . However, as is standard, we allow for the possibility that consumption and the equity dividend may differ. In an endowment economy, this is equivalent to assuming two or more sources for stochastic endowments with the equity dividend being one of them and consumption equaling the sum of all endowments. Without loss of generality, assume that the economy consists of unit of each asset. Denote the consumption endowment process as {e t }, and the dividend endowment process as {D t }. Assume that growth rates x t+1 = e t+1 et
jointly follow a first-order Markov process, and denote this joint process as {y t }. The price of a claim to the total consumption endowment is denoted as the P x (y t , e t ), and the price of a claim to the equity dividend is P d (y t , D t ). In light of the homogeneity of preferences it follows that prices are linearly homogeneous in endowments:
where P x (y) and P d (y) are price-dividend ratios. R x t+1 and R d t+1 are the t to t + 1 returns to the consumption and equity endowments respectively. These returns depend only on growth rates and price-dividend ratios via the equations:
and
In equilibrium, the agent maximizes utility, markets clear, and price expectations are fulfilled. The Euler equation for utility maximization from Epstein and Zin (1989) is given by
where
Optimality implies that the variable z t+1 would be equal to one in a deterministic economy. Therefore, a natural interpretation of the stochastic process {z t } is the ex post saving error resulting from the stochastic environment. Equation (13) implies that along any optimal path, the certainty equivalent of these errors is equal to one. If we substitute the definition of the return to total consumption from equation (11) into this Euler equation, and apply the property of linear homogeneity of the certainty equivalent operator, we obtain a recursive equation for the equilibrium pricing function, as in Epstein and Zin (1990) :
The equilibrium returns of other assets, namely the equity return R d t+1 and the risk-free rate r t on a one-period zero net-supply bond requires a solution to the representative agent's optimal portfolio choice problem. Consider a portfolio problem with N assets. From Epstein and Zin (1989) , the individual's portfolio choice across N assets with returns R i t+1 , i = 1, 2, ..., N , solves
is a portfolio return and φ t+1 is the agent's marginal utility of wealth at date t + 1 (which, in can be deduced from (13)). The first-order conditions for the portfolio problem, using (8), are:
for i = 1, 2, ..., N , where I(·) is the indicator function and R ω * t+1 denotes the return of the optimal portfolio. Note, the portfolio constraint is arbitrarily imposed on asset j. That is, ω j = 1 − i =j ω i . To simplify this further, multiply equation (17) by ω * j and sum over j to obtain
In equilibrium, R
and, as in Epstein and Zin (1989) ,
. Therefore, using equation (3), the right-hand-side of equation (18) can be written as
In addition, the equilibrium condition (13) pins down the disappointment threshold since µ t (z t+1 ) = 1. Therefore, equations (13) and (18) imply
Equation (19) implicitly defines the equilibrium pricing kernel, M t+1 , that
Of particular interest to the quantitative analysis below is the equilibrium price-dividend ratio of the equity asset, which is given by
and the price of a one-period, zero-net supply, riskless bond (with a face value of 1), which is given by
For a clearer understanding of the role of GDA, it is helpful to consider the case where α = 1 and γ = 1. That is, a model in which intertemporal substitution is perfectly elastic along deterministic paths, and in which disappointment aversion (θ > 0) is the only source of risk aversion. In this case, the pricing kernel simplifies to
Calibration
To investigate the quantitative implications of our model of risk preferences, we adopt the two-state calibration of the endowment-growth process described in Mehra and Prescott (1985) . As described in the introduction, the expected value of and standard deviation of the endowment growth rate are 1.018 and 0.036, respectively. For a symmetric ergodic distribution, i.e., an unconditional probability of 0.5, the two growth-rate states are x L = 1.018 − 0.036 = 0.982 and x H = 1.018 + 0.036 = 1.054. The first-order autocorrelation of these growth rates is calibrated to be -0.14, which implies the Markov transition probabilities, π jk , shown in equation (1). Here, we consider a dividend process that is perfectly correlated with consumption (a one-factor model). We present the results for dividend growth with standard deviation of 0.05 and 0.10. In both cases, the mean dividend growth is equal to the mean growth rate of total consumption. Table 1 present the results for various preference specifications. We do not experiment too broadly in the calibration of preference parameters, but rather choose values that are representative of the general patterns implied by each of the models under consideration. Table 1 reports five preference models: time-additive expected utility (denoted EU), Kreps and Porteus (1978) recursive utility with an infinite intertemporal substitution elasticity along deterministic consumption paths, γ = 1 (denoted KP1), Kreps-Porteus utility with intertemporal complementarity in consumption, γ = −9 (denoted KP2), the Disappointment Aversion (DA) model of Gul (1991) (denoted DA), and Generalized Disappointment Aversion (GDA). For the DA and GDA models, we fix the parameters α and γ at values of 1. The resulting models have linearity properties that are computationally attractive (the pricing kernel for this case is given in equation (23)). We explore non-linear versions of the GDA model in Table 2 . In all calibrations, the marginal rate of time-preference is fixed at ρ = 0.03.
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The most striking feature of Table 1 is the ability of the GDA model to generate counter-cyclical risk aversion. The pricing kernel in the low state is dramatically different and substantially more volatile than in the high state. In fact, since disappointment aversion is the only source of risk aversion in this calibration, the pricing kernel is risk neutral in the high state since there are no disappointing outcomes Note,π HL = π HL and E H [R d t+1 − r t ] = 0. In the low state, the disappointment aversion generates substantial risk aversion.
Note, from equation (23) The table also reports the mean and standard deviation for the equity return (R d t ) and the risk-free rate (r t ). Notice that the standard equity-premiumpuzzle patterns are present in this table. For example, the expected utility model can generate a substantial equity premium when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is large (e.g. 32.54 in the table). However, this also results in a large and very volatile risk-free rate. Although the GDA model exhibits counter-cyclical risk aversion, it does not generate a very large average equity premium for the case where dividend volatility is 0.05 (Panel C). Increasing the volatility of the dividend growth process to 0.10 (Panel D), which is an intermediate value among those considered in Campbell (1999) , improves the equity premium performance of the GDA model. The results in Table 1 are very favorable to the GDA model both in terms of the counter-cyclical risk aversion as well as the size and volatility of asset returns.
The counter-cyclical risk aversion for our GDA model in Table 1 manifests itself in return predictability. GDA preferences lead to persistence in the price of risk. Empirical research typically focuses on the persistence of the pricedividend ratio. However, in our setting, it is simpler to focus on the properties of the risk-neutral density. In our Mehra-Prescott calibration consumption growth has a symmetric ergodic distribution (i.e., Prob(x L ) = 0.5) and an autocorrelation of −0.14. The risk-neutral probabilities in Table 1 have a skewed ergodic distribution with Prob(x L ) = 0.8296 and an autocorrelation parameter of 0.3130 reflecting the persistent price of risk. However, our twostate calibration is not well suited to studying the long-horizon predictability properties of the type documented in Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French (1988) . This is not a feature of GDA preferences, but of the sparse state-space in our calibration. Having only two consumption-growth states, with no other state variables, highlights the connection between preferences and endogenous returns but implies that there are no long-horizon dynamic properties that can be uncovered with simulation analysis (as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) ).
Our assumption that all endowments are generated by a single factor allows us to study returns in the convenient and easy-to-interpret two-state model. However, since this also implies that equity-dividend growth is perfectly correlated with consumption growth, it would seem to make this asset especially, and perhaps counter-factually, risky. US data suggest that this correlation is likely to be closer to 0.25 (see Campbell (1999) ). It is straightforward to specify, calibrate and solve a model with two (or more) factors and choose alternative dividend-consumption correlation. However, the key result in Table  1 is the counter-cyclical risk aversion produced by the GDA model. This basic feature of the one-state-variable model will extend to a more general and more realistic-looking case, therefore, we do not introduce this added complexity here. Note in Table 1 , Panels C and D, that changing the risk in dividend growth effects the level of the risk premium, but not the state-dependent risk properties of the GDA model. This is not surprising since the state-dependent risk-aversion feature is driven by the consumption growth process (see equation (20) and the discussion below). Any portion of the equity risk that is lost when the correlation is lowered can be replaced through compensations in other parameters (e.g., σ(d) could be increased to a more realistic value like the 0.28 suggested by Campbell (1999) , or risk aversion could be increased either through increases in θ or decreases in α).
Discussion -Counter Cyclical Risk Aversion
The GDA calibration in Table 1 exhibits counter-cyclical risk aversion. For this to occur, equation (13) implies that it must be the case that z LL < δ but z HL > δ. To understand how this condition produces the counter-cyclical risk aversion, consider the gambles shown in Figure 3 for the case where α = 1 and γ = 1. In this setting, whether or not z t is less than δ amounts to comparing R x t+1 to the value of δ(1+ρ). Indifference curves in this case are piecewise linear, with the location of the kinks determined by both the parameter δ and the probabilities, π HL and π LL . Since the transition probability is a function of the current state in a dynamic model, the location of the kink, i.e., the definition of a disappointing outcome, changes with the state. In the high consumptiongrowth state, the figure depicts the case where neither return is disappointing. Both returns are larger than δ(1+ρ). Therefore, the agent is risk neutral in this state. In the low consumption-growth state, the low return is disappointing since R LL is below δ(1+ρ). Here, the agent is risk averse, with the parameter θ governing the degree of risk aversion. This increase in risk aversion across the two states in accomplished while maintaining a constant certainty equivalent of the each gamble, µ t (R x t+1 ) = 1 + ρ. In this example, we can also see that state dependent risk aversion depends on an appropriate level of δ. A lower value of δ, which results in less scope for disappointing outcomes, will eliminate this state-dependent risk aversion since it will lead to risk neutrality in both states. In the low consumption-growth state, the low return will no longer be disappointing. Increasing the value of δ will also eliminate state-dependent risk aversion since it will lead to risk aversion in both states. In the high consumption-growth state, the low return will become disappointing. When the value of δ is increased to 1, the model become the Gul's Disappointment Aversion model which, as depicted in Figure 4 , has comparable risk aversion across both states. In Figure 4 , the only difference in the slopes of indifference curves across states arises from the difference in transition probabilities (which are quite small in the typical asset-pricing application).
Recall that utility is not differentiable at δµ. This is the source of the "kink" in the indifference curves in Figures 3 and 4 . Note, however, that the kink is not the source of the equity premium nor the state-dependent risk aversion as none of lotteries being evaluated are at the kink.
8 One can "smooth" the kink without changing the results. What the "kink"does deliver is parsimony. GDA preferences are two parameters away from expected utility. In fact, in the linear model in Table 1 with α = γ = 1, GDA preferences capture the salient empirical properties with just two parameters.
Since GDA preferences are homothetic, they have the same aggregation properties as CRRA expected utility. Namely, identical preferences allows us to ignore the wealth distribution. Extending the analysis to consider preference heterogeneity is a as straightforward exercise, but is outside the scope of the current paper. However, there is good reason to think that the key GDA properties will survive aggregation across heterogeneous agents. The key to our calibration is that people are (effectively) more risk averse in recessions since the lottery faced in that state has more disappointment potential. Presumably, the challenge in a heterogeneous agent GDA model would be to parameterize preferences so that "enough" people faced more disappointment in recessions. In our calibration, the preferences are not "knife-edge." That is, there is a range of parameters (δ in particular) that yield the equilibrium state dependent risk aversion property. Moreover, as described above, the existence of the "kink" in indifference curves is not central to the model. However, we leave a thorough analysis of heterogeneity to future research.
Discussion -Risk Free Rate
One attractive feature of both the DA and the GDA models shown in Table 1 is the ability to produce a reasonable equity premium (Panels C and D) without inducing large volatility in the risk free rate (Panel B). In Figures 3 and 4 , the DA (and GDA) models effectively separate the slope of the indifference curve at at (R j,L , R j,H ), the future utility lottery, from the certainty equivalent level (i.e., where the indifference curve crosses the 45-degree line). Recall that in the expected utility and Kreps-Porteus models, the curvature introduced by α (the risk aversion parameter) also affects where the indifference curve intersects the 45-degree line. This separation in DA and GDA preferences is helpful since the risk-free rate is determined by the trade-off between today's consumption and the certainty equivalent of future utility. In the linear calibration of DA and GDA in Table 1 , the risk free rate is governed primarily by the parameter ρ. To see this note, when α = γ = 1, M t+1 is given by (23) which implies a risk-free return
For DA (δ = 1), this calibration produces a constant risk-free return r t = 1+ρ. For GDA where δ < 1, the risk-free rate has a small amount of volatility (note in Table 1 that δ = .97 is close to one) and is pro-cyclical. Moreover, the risk-free rate is not very sensitive to the disappointment parameter θ. Thus θ can induce a large degree of risk-aversion (which is state-dependent in GDA) without having much of an effect on the risk-free rate. We leave a more extensive term-structure analysis to future research.
Calibration -Additional Non-Linearities
The choices of α = 1 and γ = 1 for the GDA model in Table 1 , though convenient for computations, may seem a bit extreme and certainly untraditional for asset-pricing models. Moreover, in the context of a macroeconomic model, an infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution would make these preferences inconsistent with the basic facts of standard growth and real business cycle models. Table 2 explores the quantitative implications for our model for other choices of θ, α, and γ. The first column of the table establishes that in the linear GDA model, α = 1 and γ = 1, increasing θ from 9 to 24 does little more than increase the average equity premium. That general pattern is repeated in the next two columns which increase the coefficient of relative risk aversion (absent disappointment) from the Table 1 value of 0 to 0.5 and 3, respectively. This is a quantitative result not a theoretical restriction. In theory, since the equilibrium value of R x t+1 is a function of α, the potential for disappointment to vary across states and the consequent state-dependent risk aversion, could have been eliminated as α changed. The fact that this does not happen reassures us that counter-cyclical risk aversion is a reasonably robust feature of the model. As discussed above, δ must be carefully chosen to generate state-dependent risk aversion. However, Table 2 illustrates that our choice of δ is not a knife-edge case. The final 2 columns of Table 2 vary the elasticity of substitution parameter to allow for less extreme substitutability (γ = 0.5), and to allow for intertemporal complementarity (γ = −0.5). Once again, the basic properties of the model are unchanged, with the exception of substantially higher risk-free rates, especially in the low state. Note, however, that the values of ρ and δ are held constant across all of these experiments and across the GDA model in Table 1 . The discreteness of the state space allows us some flexibility in the choice of δ so that disappointment still only applies in the low state, but the risk-free rate will be lower as discussed in Section 3.3. Likewise, the relatively large value for ρ was adopted to insure existence of equilibrium in the GDA model in Table 1 which did not have much curvature to dampen the long-run effects of the positive average growth in consumption. For the models with γ < 1, equilibrium will exist for smaller values of ρ. As with δ, ρ can therefore be lowered to bring down the level of the interest rate without altering the state-dependence of disappointment result which drives the large equity premium. Overall, the basic properties of the GDA model exhibited in Table 1 hold for other, perhaps more reasonable, parameter values. Alternatively, very little is lost, at least in the 2-state model, by the simplifying linearity assumptions of the GDA model in Table 1 or equation (23).
Calibration -Consumption Process
Marginal utility in our model is driven entirely by consumption. Any dynamic properties of the pricing kernel originate with the dynamic properties of consumption growth. The evidence on size, and even the sign, of the autocorrelation parameter of consumption growth is weak. Tables 1 and 2 use the autocorrelation parameter of −0.14 as in Mehra and Prescott. Table 3 documents the quantitative implications for the GDA model for other values. Since the EU, KP, and DA models in Table 1 are not very sensitive to the consumption process (i.e., they cannot produce state dependent risk aversion for any choice of consumption growth parameters), we concentrate on the GDA model in Table 3 .
The first-order autocorrelation of post-war non-durable/service consumption growth is about 0.20 (Campbell (1999) ). The fourth column of Table 3 illustrates that the GDA model can generate endogenous state-dependent risk aversion when consumption growth exhibits positive autocorrelation. In fact, the risk-free rate, the equity premium, and the conditional equity premiums are very similar to the GDA model in the Mehra-Prescott economy (reproduced in column one of the table). Notably, however, the disappointment threshold, δ, required in this setting must be larger than one.
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To understand why δ > 1 leads to counter cyclical risk aversion when consumption growth has positive autocorrelation, refer back to Figure 1 (c) and (d). Recall that lotteries located in the upper-left corner are better than lotteries in the lower right; that is they have higher certainty equivalents. In Figure  1 (c), with δ < 1, disappointment effects are present for high-value lotteries (upper left) and not for low-value lotteries (lower right). The parallel indifference curves for low-utility lotteries imply expected-utility-like behavior. In the calibrations we consider in Table 3 with α = 1, this portion of the simplex corresponds to risk-neutral valuation. The sign of consumption autocorrelation determines the relative value (location) of the lotteries over future utility 9 The preferences for δ > 1 are stated in equation (9). It is straightforward to derive the pricing kernel analogous to equation (20) as
the representative agent faces, conditional on the current state. With positive autocorrelation of consumption growth, the future-utility lottery faced after high consumption growth is better than that faced after low growth. Therefore, for effective risk aversion to be higher in the low-consumption growth state, disappointment effects need to be present for low-valued lotteries. This requires δ > 1 as in Figure 1 (d) .
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If consumption growth is i.i.d., then the GDA model cannot produce statedependent risk aversion. If transition probabilities do not vary across states, the disappointment threshold cannot vary across states.
11 However, columns two and three of Table 3 illustrate that only a slight amount of (positive or negative) autocorrelation is necessary to facilitate a GDA model with statedependent risk aversion. While this is remarkable, one should interpret this result with caution. For small values of consumption-growth autocorrelation, the pricing equation in (15) implies little variation in the price/dividend ratios. In particular, R LL is close to R HL implying z LL is close to z HL (see (14)). Therefore, the range of δ that satisfy the the necessary condition for statedependent risk aversion is small.
Discussion -Interpreting GDA parameter values
The GDA parameters θ and δ produce behavior that is risk averse. However, it is worth considering the magnitudes of these preference parameters that generate the favorable asset-pricing implications relative to the risk-aversion parameter in the standard expected utility model.
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In the simple two-state example, a more mechanical explanation can be found by examining equations (14) and (15). Positive autocorrelation of consumption growth implies P x L < P x H which, for the case of α = γ = 1 implies that z LL > z LH and z HL > z HH . Therefore, z LL < δ < z HL is not feasible. However, z HL > δ > z HH is feasible but requires δ > 1 (recall µ t (z t+1 ) = 1 and the certainty equivalent must lie in the support).
11 Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) generate statedependent pricing kernels even with consumption growth that is i.i.d. through the dynamics of other state variables that affect marginal utility.
The value of θ = 9 in Table 1 , generates substantial risk aversion in the low state: the ratio of M LL to M LH is equal to 10. Comparing this to the expected utility model, we know that to generate this amount of apparent risk aversion in the pricing kernel, requires an value for α such that (x L /x H ) α−1 = 10, or α = −31.5424 (which is the value used for the expected utility model in Table  1 ). In other words, in the low state, the consumer is responding to the binary Euler-equation gamble in a way that is comparable to an agent with expected utility and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of about 32.5. Unlike expected utility agent, however, the GDA agent is perfectly risk neutral when valuing the binary Euler-equation gamble in the high state. The expected utility agent has a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 32.5 regardless the nature of the gamble. This feature of GDA greatly mitigates overall risk aversion: roughly half the time, the GDA agent acts like an expected utility agent with CRRA=32.5, and half the time the GDA agent acts like an expected utility agent with CRRA=0, i.e., risk neutral. In a similar fashion, in the low state, the GDA agent in Table 1 acts just like the DA agent. However, the DA agent remains extremely risk averse in the high state, compared to the risk neutrality of the GDA agent.
The parameter δ determines the threshold for disappointment. In the consumption-savings problem that underlies our asset pricing model, the definition of disappointment also depends on the intertemporal substitution parameter γ and the rate of time preference, ρ. Recall from equation (13), optimality sets the certainty equivalent of the ex post saving error, z t+1 , to one. z t+1 is the the ratio of the slope of the constraint, R ω t+1 , to the slope of the indifference curve, (1 + ρ)(c t /c t+1 ) γ−1 , raised to the power 1/γ. For the case of δ = 1, z t+1 < 1 is disappointing. If intertemporal consumptions along deterministic paths are substitutes, γ > 0, then z t+1 < 1 implies that the realization that period-t savings was larger than would have been optimal ex post, is the disappointing outcome. Conversely, if intertemporal consumption is complementary, γ < 0, the realization that period-t savings was smaller than would have been optimal ex post, is the disappointing outcome. Therefore, the nature of disappointment depends on the sign of the substitution parameter γ. In the GDA model, with δ < 1, the sign of γ also plays an important role in the interpretation of the magnitude of the disappointment threshold, δ. In this case, when γ > 0, the ex post outcome is disappointing when period-t savings was sufficiently large that the slope of the indifference curve exceeds the slope of the budget constraint by an amount δ γ . For example, in column 4 of Table   2 , when δ = 0.9692 and γ = 0.5, the value of δ γ is 0.9845. This means that missing the deterministic tangency condition by having the indifference curve 1.55 percent steeper (or more) than the budget constraint constitutes a disappointment. When γ < 0, the ex post outcome is disappointing when period-t savings was sufficiently small that the slope of the indifference curve exceeds the slope of the budget constraint by δ γ . For example, in column 5 of Table   2 , when δ = 0.9692 and γ = −0.5, δ γ = 1.0158 and missing the deterministic tangency condition by having the budget constraint 1.58 percent steeper (or more) than the indifference curve constitutes a disappointment. The values in Table 1 , with γ = 1 and δ = 0.9692, therefore, imply that over-savings such that ex post indifference curve is 3.08 percent (or more) steeper than the ex post return constitutes disappointment.
Conclusion
We have provided an axiomatic generalization of the disappointment aversion preferences of Gul (1991) which allow for a more flexible definition of a "disappointing" outcome. In particular, our one-parameter extension of Gul's utility function allows us to characterize outcomes in a lottery as disappointing not when they lie below that lottery's certainty equivalent, but rather when they are sufficiently far below the certainty equivalent. This focus on more extreme tail behavior is consistent with real-world approaches such as "value at risk" calculations in finance (see Basak and Shapiro (2001) ), and with much of the behavioral/experimental evidence, such as Allais (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Our generalization maintains the standard properties of monotonicity (first-order stochastic dominance), and risk aversion (second-order stochastic dominance). As well, GDA preferences are linear-in-probabilities, and have a certainty equivalent that is linearly homogeneous. These features facilitate the use of standard recursive utility and Euler equation analysis in an asset-pricing model, while allowing a richer characterization of risk preferences.
When we embed our new model of risk preferences in a Lucas-tree assetpricing economy, our model is capable of generating asset-prices consistent with the observed asset market data. In particular, our preference specification generates effective risk aversion that is both state-dependent and countercyclical. The empirical finance literature has highlighted the importance of these two properties as necessary features of any asset pricing model. Our axiomatic approach allows us to have a deeper understanding of the preferencebased origins of this time-varying risk aversion and allows us to better evaluate the structural stability of our preference parameters.
Future research will take further advantage of the tractability of the Euler equations in our model to explore the empirical implications of our new preference specification using both Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) bounds and GMM estimation as in Epstein and Zin (2001) . In addition, we can apply GDA to explore other asset-pricing puzzles in the term structure of interest rates, the variation in equity premium across individual stocks, and for understanding the dynamics of portfolio choice.
) and p q if and only if µ(p) ≥ µ(q).
Proof: Dekel (1986) and Chew (1989) show that preferences satisfy axiom 1 if and only if there exists a function U such that µ(p) uniquely solves 
is continuous and increasing in x, decreasing in m, and F (x, m) = 0 if x = m. Since the function is continuous, we can now partition this function (note ∆ k (·) are invertible). Let
Finally, rescale the function by θ k .
Proof of Theorem 1: The above lemma shows that axiom 1 implies the functional form of equation (A1). In addition, ∆ k (m) and L k (x, δ k (m)) are increasing in x and decreasing in m, ensuring µ(p) = M (p, µ(p)) exists and is unique. Finally,
To prove the theorem, we need to establish that axiom 2 implies that K = 1, ∆ 1 (m) = δm, L 1 (x, δm) = (δm) − (x) with (·) as an increasing funtion. For exposition, consider u(x) = x and X = [0, 1], since extending to general u(x) and X is straightforward. The δ-Weak Independence axiom can be stated as
Assume p 1 , p 2 , and λ satisfy the necessary conditions of equation (A3). For notation, let
. Consider equation (A1) with one cut-off (K = 1).
where I(·) is an indicator function. For θ > 0 and for arbitrary ∆(m) and L(x, ∆(m)), it is easy to construct lotteries such thatμ 1 <μ 2 . Satisfying Weak Independence requires that ∆(m) = δm (hence K = 1 and there can be no other cut-offs). This implieŝ
.
By parts (iii) and (iv) of (A3),
Again, for arbitrary L(x, δm) we can construct lotteries such thatμ 2 >μ 1 (violating weak independence). It must therefore be the case that the loss function is separable in x and δm. The restriction that L(x, δm) = 0 if x = δm means that an additively separable loss function must be of the form L(m, x) = (δm) − (x), where (·) is an increasing function. Inserting this into (A4) and using, by part (ii) of (A3) that
In this form, if µ 1 > µ 2 thenμ 1 >μ 2 satisfying weak independence.
Proof of Theorem 2: Using axiom 3, for lotteries p 1 and p 2 , let µ jb = µ λx 0 + (1 − λ)p j and µ jw = µ (λp j + (1 − λ)x 0 ). We calculate these certainty equivalents next, using the fact that δµ jw < z < δµ jb for all z ∈ supp(p j ).
µ jw depends on p j only through the first moment (the first term of equation (A5)). However, µ jb depends on the first moment of p as well as moments generated by (·) (note p j (x i ) (x i ) in equation (A6)). Symmetry requires that µ 1b ≥ µ 2b if and only if µ 1w ≥ µ 2w . The only way this condition can be satisfied for all lotteries is for the penalty function, (·) to be affine. Given we can re-scale with the parameter θ, setting (x) = x (or more generally, (·) = u(·)) is without loss of generality. 1 1−γ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; θ is the coefficient of disappointment aversion; and δ is the threshold for disappointment (see equation (2)). For EU, KP1, and KP2, θ = 0 by definition and δ can be arbitrary. As in Mehra and Prescott (1985) , the 2-state Markov chain for consumption-growth has a mean of 1.018, a standard deviation of 0.036, an autocorrelation of −0.14, and a symmetric ergodic distribution. The equity return is perfectly correlated to consumption with a standard deviation of 0.05 in Panel C and 0.10 in Panel D. In Panel A, M ij is the the pricing kernel andπ ij is the risk-neutral probabilities (i.e., Consumption Growth Autocorrelation -0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.20 α 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 γ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 θ 9.0000 9.0000 9.0000 9.0000 δ 0.9692 0.9650 1.0357 1.0431 ρ 0.0300 0.0300 0.0300 0.0300 Indifference curves over outcomes (R Indifference curves over outcomes (R 
